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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
along with other areas of civil liability. 90 Whatever the likelihood of such
an occurrence, its effectiveness would be suspect, at least in certain areas;"
for to remain flexible enough to be effective, the language of any codifi-
cation would have to be broad, and judicial interpretation and incon-
sistencies would follow. Third, the SEC could codify the area by rewrit-
ing the rule. Certainly it has the power to do so, 92 and presumably, as
the issuer and enforcer of rule lOb-5, it has the necessary expertise.9 3
Finally, the Supreme Court could, in precise terms, articulate the desired
rule. Given the lower federal courts' propensity to seize the meager
Supreme Court pronouncement available in this area,94 this approach
would most likely be the quickest and least tedious.
As previously noted,9 5 an analysis of the class of persons protected
by rule lOb-5 demonstrates a need for a "limiting doctrine" which retains
the flexibility necessary to adapt to a multitude of factual situations so as
not to deny a "proper" plaintiff a cause of action. Since its inception, the
Birnbaum purchaser-seller rule has been the means chosen to fulfill this
need. The decision in Eason reflects judicial dissatisfaction with the suit-
ability of Birnbaum to the task, and presents a welcomed analysis of the
problems involved and a suggested solution.
Garry Paul Jerome
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE - SECTION 2-719(3) - PRE-
SUMPTION OF UNCONSCIONABILITY ON THE PART OF TIRE MANU-
FACTURER FOR EXCLUSION OF LIABILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURIES
UNDER EXPRESS WARRANTY AGAINST BLOWOUTS Is NOT REBUTTED
BY PROOF THAT THE TIRE WAS NOT DEFECTIVE.
Collins v. Uniroyal, Inc. (N.J. 1974)
Plaintiff brought suit in a New Jersey state court against Uniroyal,
Inc. (Uniroyal), to recover damages for the death of her husband, who
was killed when the failure of a tire manufactured by defendant caused his
90. The American Law Institute has begun drafting a Federal Securities Code.
To date, three tentative drafts have been produced. FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE (Tent.
Draft No. 3, 1974) ; FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1973); FEDERAL
SECURITIES CODE (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1972). The relevant section of the Code takes
no position on the Birnbaum issue; rather, it leaves the matter to judicial discretion.
Tent. Draft No. 2, §§ 1402(a)-(c), comment 3, at 79.
91. In discussing the codification of the securities laws, Professor Loss remarked
that rule lOb-5 was not yet "ripe" for codification; rather, its development by thejudicial system must continue. FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE, Introductory Memorandum
at xxxvi-xxxvii (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1972).
92. 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATIONS 1469 n.87 (2d ed. 1961).
93. The SEC apparently has made the decision not to rewrite rule 10b-5, choos-
ing instead to persuade the courts, via amicus curiae participation, to eliminate the
purchaser-seller requirement from their interpretation of rule 10b-5. See, e.g.,
Mount Clemens Indus., Inc. v. Bell, 464 F.2d 339, 341 (9th Cir. 1974) ; Vine v. Bene-
ficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627, 636 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967).
94. See note 51 supra.
95. See text accompanying notes 55-59 supra.
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automobile to go out of control.' The complainant sought relief on two
theories: 1) strict liability in tort ;2 and 2) breach of the express warranty3
embodied in Uniroyal's "Road Hazard" guarantee,4 which had expressly
1. Collins v. Uniroyal, Inc., 126 N.J. Super. 401, 404, 315 A.2d 30, 32 (App.
Div. 1974) (per curiam). Decedent had purchased the tire from a Uniroyal distributor
about five months prior to the accident. Id. at 404, 315 A.2d at 32.
2. Id. at 404, 315 A.2d at 32. To establish a cause of action in strict liability, it
is unnecessary for a plaintiff to prove negligence on the part of the defendant. The
clearest definition of strict liability in the products liability context is that contained
in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dan-
gerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without sub-
stantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale
of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
Id. § 402A (1964) (emphasis supplied). While the Restatement's definition imposes
liability on the manufacturer only for personal or property damage, New Jersey law
extends the manufacturer's liability to include economic loss as well. See Santor v.
A.&M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965), wherein the New Jersey
Supreme Court held the manufacturer liable for damages in an amount sufficient to
compensate plaintiff for the loss of his bargain when carpeting purchased from
defendant proved defective but not unreasonably dangerous.
3. 126 N.J. Super. at 404, 315 A.2d at 32 (1974). In the instant case, the law
of express warranty is governed by the 1962 version of the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE [hereinafter cited as the Code or UCC], which was adopted in New Jersey
effective January 1, 1963. (The 1962 version of the Code has been adopted by the
District of Columbia and all the states but Louisiana.) The text of the UCC is con-
tained in Title 12A of the New Jersey Statutes Annotated. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§
12A:1-101 et seq. (1962). For convenience, references herein are to the 1962 Official
Text of the UCC as published by the American Law Institute and the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. UCC §§ 1-101 et seq. (1962
version). In order to convert these references to the manner in which they appear in
the New Jersey Statutes Annotated, the reader should add the prefix "12A" to all
of the sections cited.
UCC § 2-313 defines express warranties:
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer
which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the
bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to
the affirmation or promise.
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the
bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform
to the description.
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of the bargain
creates an express warranty that the whole of the goods shall con-
form to the sample or model.
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the seller
use formal words such as "warrant" or "guarantee" or that he have a
specific intention to make a warranty, but an affirmation merely of the
value of the goods or a statement purporting to be merely the seller's
opinion or commendation of the goods does not create a warranty.
Id.
In order to recover for breach of express warranty under section 2-313, a
plaintiff must prove: 1) the existence of an express warranty as defined within the
section; 2) nonconformity of the product with the terms of the warranty; 3) injury;
and 4) proximate causation of the injury by the breach. See notes 16-19 and accom-
panying text infra.
4. Manufacturer Uniroyal gave the following warranty:
The new U.S. Royal Master tire with wraparound tread and pin stripe (1/2 inch) 2
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excluded liability for consequential damages 5 and limited liability to repair
or replacement of the tire.6 The trial judge therefore instructed the jury
that such limitation was invalid under New Jersey law.7 The jury returned
a verdict favorable to plaintiff on the breach of warranty count, but adverse
to plaintiff on the strict liability count.8 On appeal, defendant argued,
inter alia, that the instruction was improper, but the Superior Court of New
Jersey rejected this contention and affirmed the trial court., The Supreme
Court of New Jersey, in a per curiam opinion, affirmed, holding that even
whitewall design is of such quality and reliability that U.S. Rubber Tire Company
makes the following Guarantee:
LIFETIME - Every such U.S. Royal Master tire of our manufacture, bear-
ing our name and serial number, other than "seconds," is guaranteed to
be free from defects in workmanship and material for the life of the original
tread without limit as to time or mileage.
ROAD HAZARD - In addition, every such U.S. Royal Master tire, when used
in normal passenger car service, is guaranteed during the life of the original
tread against blowouts, cuts, bruises, and similar injury rendering the tire
unserviceable. Tires which are punctured or abused, by being run flat, im-
properly aligned, balanced, or inflated, cut by chains or obstructions on vehicle,
damaged by fire, collision or vandalism, or by other means, and "seconds" are
not subject to the road hazard provision of this Guarantee.
If our examination shows that such a U.S. Royal Master tire is eligible for adjust-
ment under either the Lifetime or Road Hazard provision of this Guarantee, we
will repair it or provide a new U.S. Royal Master tire at a fractional price
computed on percentage of wear of original tread depth and then current U.S.
suggested exchange price as follows: [There followed a rate chart and several
additional paragraphs not relevant here.]
This Guarantee does not cover consequential damages, and the liability of the
manufacturer is limited to repairing or replacing the tire in accordance with the
stipulations contained in this guarantee. No other guarantee or warranty, express
or implied, is made.
126 N.J. Super. at 405-06, 315 A.2d at 33 (emphasis by the court).
5. Consequential damages, as defined in the UCC, include:
(a) any loss resulting from general or particular requirements and needs
of which the seller at the time of contracting had reason to know and
which could not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise; and
(b) injury to person or property proximately resulting from any breach
of warranty.
UCC § 2-715(2). The damages claimed by plaintiff in the instant case were covered
by this section of the Code. 126 N.J. Super. at 406, 315 A.2d at 33.
6. Although recovery of consequential damages is permitted by section 2-714(3)
of the UCC, section 2-719 allows the parties to a contract to limit or exclude available
remedies, unless it is unconscionable to do so. UCC § 2-719. See notes 22-23 and
accompanying text infra.
7. 126 N.J. Super. at 406, 315 A.2d at 33.
8. Id. at 404, 315 A.2d at 32. The trial judge submitted the cause to the jury
on both theories of recovery with instructions, in case of a verdict in favor of plaintiff,
to state whether the basis of recovery was strict liability, breach of express warranty,
or both. Id.
9. Id. at 406, 315 A.2d at 33. Defendant also alleged error in the judge's in-
struction that proof of the technical cause of the blowout or of a specific defect was
unnecessary to a cause of action for breach of warranty, and in his admitting de-
fendant's advertisement into evidence. Similarly, defendant raised certain questions
with respect to the strict liability count. However, the court rejected all the argu-
ments advanced. Id. at 404-09, 315 A.2d at 32-35.
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where the jury makes a finding of "no defect" in the subject goods,' 0 it is
"patently unconscionable"" under section 2-719(3) of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code (UCC) for a manufacturer to limit his liability for con-
sequential damages from a breach of warranty proximately resulting in
the purchaser's death. Collins v. Uniroyal, Inc., 64 N.J. 260, 315 A.2d
16 (1974).
The UCC was drafted with the intent of balancing the needs of both
buyer and seller. 12 By virtue of the provisions of its Article 2 on Sales,'"
the seller of goods 14 may create an express warranty, 15 which, if breached,
gives the buyer'0 a cause of action in contract. 17 Section 2-714 of the UCC
specifically authorizes recovery of damages for breach of warranty' s and
expressly allows recovery of consequential damages, in a proper case, for
nonconformity of accepted goods.' 9 However, as a means of protecting the
seller,2 0 contractual limitation of remedy for breach of warranty is per-
10. Collins v. Uniroyal, Inc., 64 N.J. 260, 262, 315 A.2d 16, 17 (1974). The
court mentioned the alternative possibility that this adverse finding meant simply that
plaintiff had failed to meet her burden of proof rather than that the tire was not
defective. Id., 315 A.2d at 18. See note 58 and accompanying text infra. Mr. Justice
Clifford dissented. His opinion was based on the premise that the adverse verdict
on the strict liability count meant a jury finding of "no defect." 64 N.J. at 266, 315
A.2d at 20 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
11. For discussion of unconscionability, see notes 42-50, 72-78 and accompanying
text infra.
12. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 1 (1972) [hereinafter cited as WHITE & SUMMERS].
13. Article 2 on Sales applies only to "transactions in goods." UCC § 2-102.
See note 14 infra.
14. The Code defines "seller" as "a person who sells or contracts to sell goods,"
UCC § 2-103(d), and this definition ostensibly covers manufacturers as well as re-
tailers. The Code proceeds to define "goods" as "all things . . . which are movable
at the time of identification to the contract for sale other than the money in which
the price is to be paid, investment securities (Article 8) and things in action." Id.§ 2-105(1). In the absence of agreement to the contrary, "identification" of goods
already "existing and identified" occurs when the contract for sale is made. Id.§ 2-501(1) (a). Thus, since Article 2 covers transactions in goods, and tires fall
within the definition of "goods" found in section 2-105(1), the UCC is the applicable
law for the Collins case.
15. Express warranties, like that involved in Collins, are provided for by the
Code. UCC § 2-313. For the text of this section, see note 3 supra. The Code also
provides for an implied warranty of merchantability, id. § 2-314 (see note 68 infra),
and for an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, id. § 2-315, both of
which provide standards implied by law for the acceptability of goods' quality under
circumstances specified in those sections.
16. Analogous to the definition of "seller" is that of "buyer," which means "a
person who buys or contracts to buy goods." UCC § 2-103(1) (a).
17. For buyer's remedies provided by the Code, see generally UCC §§ 2-711
to 2-717.
18. Section 2-714(1) provides:
Where the buyer has accepted goods and given notification (subsection (3) of
Section 2-607) he may recover as damages for any non-conformity of tender the
loss resulting in the ordinary course of events from the seller's breach as deter-
mined in any manner which is reasonable.
UCC § 2-714(1).
19. UCC § 2-714(3). "Incidental" and "consequential" damages, which include
personal injuries, are both defined in section 2-715 of the Code. See note 6 supra.
20. The principle of freedom of contract provides some measure of protection for
a seller who wishes to avoid or limit his liability. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra
note 12, § 12-1. The UCC itself adopts this principle of freedom of contract in section
1-102(3). The official comment to this section states: "Subsection (3) states affirma-
tively at the outset that freedom of contract is a principle of the Code . . . ." UCC
[VOL. 19
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mitted by operation of sections 2-316(4) and 2-719.21 In particular,
section 2-719(3) permits limitation or exclusion of consequential damages
unless such action is unconscionable.2 2 Furthermore, if the limitation of
exclusion authorized by section 2-719(3) is invoked in a case which in-
volves physical injury to the purchaser proximately resulting from con-
sumer goods,2 3 the limitation or exclusion is prima facie unconscionable,
whereas, if commercial loss is involved, it is not.
Neither the Comment 24 to nor the text of this :section gives any guid-
ance as to the manner by which a defendant can overcome the finding of
§ 1-102, Comment 2. The official comments were not enacted along with the text in
New Jersey. Hence, they do not have the force of 'law, but are helpful in analyzing
the meaning of the Code's language.
21. UCC §§ 2-316(4), 2-719. Section 2-719 is as'follows:
(1) Subject to the provisions of subsections (2). and (3) of this section and
of the preceding section on liquidation andAlimitation of damages,
(a) the agreement may provide for remedies in addition to or in substi-
tution for those provided in this Article'and may limit or alter the
measure of damages recoverable under this Article, as by limiting the
buyer's remedies to return of the goods and repayment of the price
or to repair and replacement of non-conforming goods or parts; and
(b) resort to a remedy as provided is optional unless the remedy is ex-
pressly agreed to be exclusive, in which case it is the sole remedy.
(2) Where circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to fail of its
essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this Act.
(3) Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the limitation
or exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of 'consequential damages for
injury to the person in the-case of consumer goods is prima facie uncon-
scionable but limitation of damages where the loss is commercial is not.
22. See note 21 supra. Unconscionability- is governed by section 2-302 of
the Code:(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may
refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract
without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any uncon-
scionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.'
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause
thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable oppor-
tunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting,' purpose and effect to aid
the court in making the determination.
UCC § 2-302.
The Code itself does not advance a definition of unconscionability, but the
official comments indicate that both the substantive nature of contract provisions and
the circumstances surrounding the bargaining process are to be considered. See id.,
Comment 1. See notes 72-81 and accompanying text infra. The concept of uncon-
scionability is nebulous and has proved troublesome to the courts. For discussions of
unconscionability, see generally Leff, Unconscionability and the Code - The Emperor's
New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 485 (1967); Murray, Unconscionability: Uncon-
scionability, 31 U. PITT. L. REv. 1 (1969); Spanogle, Analyzing Unconscionability
Problems, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 931 (1969); Comment, Bargaining Power and Uncon-
scionability: A Suggested Approach to UCC Section 2-302, 114 U. PA. L. REv.
998 (1966).
23. The definition of "consumer goods" is contained in Article 9 of the Code
pertaining to Secured Transactions. Goods are termed "consumer goods" if they "are
used or bought for use primarily for personal, family or household purposes ...."
UCC § 9-109(1). The issue of whether consumer goods were involved was never
raised by Uniroyal and the court assumed that the tires were employed in a consumer
setting, although this was questionable, as decedent and his family were a troop of
entertainers who used their automobile as a means of transportation from one job
location to another. 64 N.J. at 265 n.3, 315 A.2d at 19 n.3 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
24. The Comment states only that such limitation may not operate in an uncon-
scionable manner and that these terms are "merely an allocation of unknown or
undeterminable risks." UCC § 2-719, Comment 3.
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prima facie unconscionability of limitation or exclusion. Case law is equally
deficient in indicating what proof is necessary to overcome the presump-
tion. For example, in Matthews v. Ford Motor Co.,25 plaintiff suffered
physical injuries in a collision caused by a defective gear-shift selector
mechanism in his automobile.26 The manufacturer had given an express
warranty to the dealer covering defects in material and workmanship, un-
like the broad warranty in Collins which guaranteed that there would be
no tire failure from any cause. The warranty included a limitation of
remedy to the repair or replacement of defective parts. The court held
the manufacturer liable for breach of the express warranty, stating clearly
that the defendant had failed to rebut the presumption of unconscionability
of the limitation of damages. 27 However, as in other cases, the Matthews
court gave no indication of how the defendant could have rebutted the
presumption.28 As a result, the Collins court had little in the way of prece-
25. 479 F.2d 399 (4th Cir. 1973).
26. Id. at 400.
27. Id. at 402.
28. Two courts have utilized this presumption to invalidate disclaimers of war-
ranty, thus confusing limitation of remedy under section 2-719 with disclaimer under
UCC section 2-316.
In Ford Motor Co. v. Tritt, 244 Ark. 883, 430 S.W.2d 778 (1968), a buyer
was killed when a defective axle caused a wheel of his truck to collapse. The court
affirmed a judgment against the local Ford dealer in favor of plaintiff's administratrix
for breach of the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness. Id. at 890, 430
S.W.2d at 783. For a reference to these types of implied warranties, see note 15 supra.
The manufacturer had given the dealer an express warranty covering defects in
material and workmanship, which included a limitation of remedy to repair or re-
placement of defective parts. This warranty from Ford to the dealer, like that ex-
tended to the purchaser by Uniroyal in Collins, was given in lieu of all other
warranties, express or implied, and the court invoked the section 2-719(3) presumption
to declare the disclaimer of the implied warranties of fitness and merchantability
by Ford unconscionable. 244 Ark. at 889, 430 S.W.2d at 781. Thus, despite the
court's reliance upon this section, the holding related to disclaimer of warranty rather
than to limitation of remedy. As a result, Tritt is an apparently incorrect application
of the correct section of the Code. The language of the Code itself makes a clear
distinction between disclaimer and limitation of remedy. UCC § 2-316(4) makes
reference to UCC § 2-719 in regard to such limitation and the official comment to
section 2-316 further emphasizes that these are different concepts. UCC § 2-316,
Comment 2. This distinction has also been recognized by many commentators dis-
cussing means which courts employ in order to invalidate disclaimers. See Franklin,
When Worlds Collide: Liability Theories and Disclaimers in Defective Product Cases,
18 STAN. L. REV. 974, 995 (1966); Comment, The Contractual Aspect of Consumer
Protection: Recent Developments in the Law of Sales Warranties, 64 MIcH. L. Rxv.
1430, 1457-58 (1966).
Nevertheless, Ford Motor Co. v. Tritt does illustrate features common to
section 2-719(3) case law: inability of the defendant to overcome the presumption;
the court's failure to indicate the means of rebuttal; and the actual determination of
defect present in all pertinent cases prior to Collins.
In Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 59 Misc. 2d 241, 298 N.Y.S.2d 538 (Sup. Ct.
1969), as in Tritt, there was a determination of defect. The manufacturer's express
warranty and limitation of remedy was the same as that involved in Tritt, and the
court conceded that UCC section 2-316 permitted disclaimer of warranty. The court
nonetheless upheld plaintiff's motion for dismissal of the affirmative defense of dis-
claimer and/or limitation of warranty, stating that defendants had not offered any
proof to rebut the plaintiff's showing that the exclusion of damages for personal in-juries was prima facie unconscionable under section 2-719(3). Id. at 242, 298
N.Y.S.2d at 540. Thus, Walsh, like Tritt, is illustrative of the confusion between
disclaimer of warranty and limitation of remedy and is not a proper section 2-719(3)
[VOL. 19'
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dent to guide it in determining whether Uniroyal had overcome the prima
facie finding of unconscionability. Nevertheless, it is submitted that on the
facts of the instant case, the Collins court did have valid grounds upon
which to hold that the section 2-719(3) presumption had been overcome,
and, by failing to do so, effectively made the exclusion of consequential
damages in the case of personal injury per se rather than prima facie
unconscionable.
In Collins, the Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed judgment in
favor of plaintiff for breach of express warranty "essentially for the reasons
stated in the opinion of the Appellate Division." 29 The lower court had
recognized correctly that under section 2-719(3), "limitation of conse-
quential damages for injury to the person in case of consumer goods is
prima facie unconscionable. °30 However, the Appellate Division determined
that there was no evidence in the record to overcome this presumption,
without discussing what evidence a defendant would have to adduce to
do so. Unlike the Appellate Division, the Supreme Court of New Jersey
addressed itself to this question, by way of answering the argument raised
in the dissenting opinion that this presumption had been overcome.3 1
Justice Clifford, in dissent, concluded that "where the express war-
ranty goes beyond what is required by the Code and the common law of
this state,32 and where the product is found to be free from defect, the
prima facie unconscionability contemplated by the Code has been over-
come."'3 3  He also determined that unconscionability did not otherwise
appear.3 4 His conclusion that the tire was not defective was based on the
contention that the jury's rejection of plaintiff's claim in strict liability in
tort indicated that the finder of fact had made a determination that there
was "no defect" in the tire,35 and was buttressed by the fact that neither
case. However, again like Tritt, it demonstrates the features common to section
2-719(3) cases.
29. 64 N.J. at 261, 315 A.2d at 17.
30. 126 N.J. Super. at 406, 315 A.2d at 34 (emphasis by the court).
31. 64 N.J. at 263, 315 A.2d at 18 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
32. By this language, Justice Clifford was referring to the implied warranty of
merchantability imposed by UCC § 2-314 (1962). 64 N.J. at 263, 272-73, 315 A.2d at
18, 23-24 (Clifford, J., dissenting). This protection for the consumer was established
in the pre-Code case of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d
69 (1960). In Henningsen, the Supreme Court of New Jersey determined, inter alia,
that an implied warranty in favor of an automobile purchaser arose against the manu-
facturer even if there was no privity between them and that a standard disclaimer
clause limiting damages to repair or replacement was void as contrary to public policy.
Id. at 404, 161 A.2d at 95. The Henningsen case has had tremendous influence in
the area of products liability and has been widely followed both for its dispensing
with privity requirements and for its invalidation of the clause. See, e.g., Lambert,
Justice Francis and Products Liability Law, 24 RUTGERS L. REv. 426, 429, 434 (1970).
33. 64 N.J. at 268, 315 A.2d at 21 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 270, 275, 315 A.2d at 22, 24 (Clifford, J., dissenting). Justice Clifford
applied standards developed in case law interpreting UCC § 2-302, the unconscion-
ability section of the Code, in reaching this conclusion. See note 22 supra and notes
72-81 and accompanying text infra.
35. 64 N.J. at 266, 315 A.2d at 20 (Clifford, J., dissenting). For a discussion of
the dissent's reasoning on this particular point, see notes 60-61 and accompanying
text infra.
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plaintiff's nor defendant's expert witnesses were able to identify or even
to suggest a possible defect 8 6
The majority, in rejecting the theory posited by the dissent, relied
upon the proposition that this was a warranty for tire failure from any
cause and therefore "an issue of freedom from defect could not be injected
by a defendant into an action for breach of express warranty for any pur-
pose at all." 7 The court initially reasoned that it was improbable that the
legislature, being aware of this consideration, intended the presumption
created by section 2-719(3) to be negated through a failure to establish
existence of a defect in the product.38 Continuing its analysis on the premise
that the existence of a defect was irrelevant in relation to damages as well
as to liability, the court stated that the plaintiff's joinder of a count in strict
liability and the jury's determination on that count should be immaterial,
even were such determination to indicate freedom from defect rather than
"mere failure of plaintiff to carry her burden of persuasion" on that point.3 9
After rejecting the dissent's basic thesis, the majority proceeded to
counter the policy reasons advanced to support it. Justice Clifford em-
phasized that allowing a limitation of damages in a case such as Uniroyal's
where the warranty advanced gave a buyer more than he was entitled to
by law would encourage such offers in the future.40 The majority criticized
this position as "not consonant with the commercial and human realities"
because of its opinion that a tire manufacturer extends warranties against
blowouts in order to increase sales.41 According to the majority, the
nature of defendant's advertising 42 made it more likely that a consumer's
36. 64 N.J. at 266, 315 A.2d at 20 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 262, 315 A.2d at 17.
38. Id.
39. Id., 315 A.2d at 17-18. The court stated that "plaintiff should not stand in a
worse posture for having joined a claim in strict liability . . . ." Id. at 262, 315 A.2d
at 18. Thus, the court revealed its favorable inclination toward the injured consumer
while casting doubt on the validity of the foundation for the dissent's argument.
40. Id. at 272, 315 A.2d at 23 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 262, 315 A.2d at 18.
42. Defendant's advertisements contained statements such as:
If it only saves your life once, its [sic] a bargain .... It could pay off some
day. The day you hit a pothole at 70 miles an hour.
The day you sweep around a tricky rain-slicked curve. The day it's 90 degrees
in the shade and you have to go 600 miles in a hurry.
The day you pick up a nail and it's three in the morning. You're getting a
brute of a carcass that's so strong, you can practically forget about blowouts.
126 N.J. Super. at 408, 315 A.2d at 34-35. At trial, defendant had unsuccessfully
objected to the admission of these advertisements into evidence. The Appellate
Division approved the trial court's hearing of this evidence, concluding that it helped
to explain the scope and intent of the "Road Hazard" warranty and reflected de-
fendant's concept of normal passenger car service. Id. at 408, 315 A.2d at 34. The
lower court was also of the opinion that because of testimony adduced at trial, the
jury could have inferred that decedent relied upon these advertisements when he
bought the tires. Id. at 408, 315 A.2d at 34.
Although not depicted as actual terms of the express warranty, the manu-
facturer's advertisements and the expectations which they created in the consumer
were salient factors in the supreme court's decision that the presumption of unconscion-
ability had not been overcome. However, it is submitted that a somewhat different
methodology should have been employed. The narrow issue under section 2-719(3)
should have been considered successfully met by defendant from the fact of the im-
plicit finding of "no defect" by the jury - a party who is totally free from "fault" as
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decision to purchase arose from a desire to protect the purchaser and his
passengers from personal injury or death in the event of a blowout rather
than to assure himself of a price refund in such a case. 48 Consequently,
in holding the seller to the realization that this was the motivating factor
behind the purchase, the Collins court considered the exclusion of conse-
quential damages "patently unconscionable" 44 under section 2-719(3).
The majority's basic premise - that the issue of freedom from defect
was irrelevant to a cause of action for breach of express warranty - was
undoubtedly correct as applied to Uniroyal's "Road Hazard" guarantee.4 5
Nevertheless, the court's opinion that the question of defect vel non was
therefore irrelevant to the question of damages as well as to liability
4 6
failed to answer the dissent's argument. While the plaintiff's right to
recover damages in Collins admittedly did not hinge upon the existence
of defect in the tire, a determination of "no defect" may have an important
bearing on the conscionability of a contractual limitation upon the type
and amount of damages recoverable, as the dissent argued.
The UCC employs the concept of "unconscionability" as a safeguard
to protect the consumer, 47 while also adopting the concept of freedom of
contract. 48 It specifically permits the parties to agree between themselves
to limit or modify the amount of damages recoverable. 49 In other words,
contemplated by personal injury law can hardly be considered guilty of unconscionable
conduct in not assuming liability for consequential damages. Plaintiff then could have
proceeded to show affirmatively the unconscionable character of defendant's conduct,
offering the advertisements as evidence of a creation of expectations. The court
would have been free to find that the frustration of such expectations would be un-
conscionable, and consequently refuse to enforce the limitation of remedy. Alterna-
tively, the court could have found the advertising to have constituted an express
warranty, separate from the written "Road Hazard" warranty and hence unaffected
by the limitation of damages. Thus, the court could have found for the plaintiff
independently of the section 2 - 719(3) presumption.
While the results under either approach would have been identical to those
reached by the court, it is submitted that they could nonetheless have been reached
by a materially different route comporting with the intended operation of section
2-719(3). Furthermore, either would have allowed a more realistic and convincing
assessment of the evidence than did the method employed in Collins.
43. 64 N.J. at 263, 315 A.2d at 18.
44. Id.
45. Breach of express warranty is dependent upon the terms of the warranty itself.
The existence of a defect may constitute a breach of an express warranty. The war-
ranty provision in Ford Motor Co. v. Tritt, 244 Ark. 883, 430 S.W.2d 778 (1968),
provided an example of this type of situation. See note 28 supra. However, the terms
of the "Road Hazard" guarantee under consideration in Collins do not mention
defect. See note 4 supra.
46. 64 N.J. at 262, 315 A.2d at 17-18.
47. UCC §§ 2-302; 2-719(3). Courts have found unconscionability under section
2-302 in purely commercial settings. See, e.g., UCC § 2-302, Comment 1. However,
they are more readily disposed to make such a determination where a consumer enters
into a contract of adhesion with a commercial entity. This disposition reflects a
tendency to use the concept where the parties are less likely to have equal bargaining
positions. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 12, §§ 4-2, 4-3. Similarly, UCC section
2-719(3) makes the limitation of consequential damages for personal injury prima
facie unconscionable in the case of consumer goods, while it does not do so where the
loss is purely commercial.
48. See note 20 supra. Section 1-102(3) of the Code provides that "the effect
of provisions of this Act may be varied by agreement, except as otherwise pro-
vided .... ." UCC § 1-102(3).
49. UCC §§ 2-316(4); 2-718; 2-719. See notes 21-23 and accompanying text supra.
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remedy limitation is not synonymous with unconscionability and does not
automatically render a contract invalid. Where a manufacturer and a
consumer agree to limit the amount of or exclude consequential damages,
and personal injury results, the UCC's policing device in section 2-719(3)
makes such agreement prima facie but not per se unconscionable. This
favorable attitude toward freedom of contract and the language of section
2-719(3) itself indicate the UCC's intent to allow a defendant in a case
such as Collins to rebut the presumption of unconscionability. 50 In view
of the UCC's scheme, a jury finding of "no defect" in a case such as the
instant one should be relevant to the issue of damages."' The majority's
reasoning to the contrary was inadequate.5 2
The dissent's approach provides a feasible solution to the problem
of what showing is necessary in order for a defendant to overcome the
presumption. If carefully limited, as the dissent emphasized, to the Collins-
type situation wherein a defendant manufacturer has given an express
warranty covering an aspect of the product which is unrelated to defects
and this warranty guarantees a purchaser more protection than that im-
plied by law,5 8 a jury finding of "no defect" would provide the basis for
a simple, clear-cut rule which would carry out the UCC's intent.54 Further-
more, the dissent's method is particularly efficacious since it is not de-
pendent upon joinder by plaintiff of a count in strict liability.55 Justice
Clifford proposed that, in order to allow the court to make a determina-
tion of unconscionability,5 6 the trial judge should instruct the jury to
50. See 64 N.J. at 267-68, 315 A.2d at 20-21 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
51. The issue of "no defect" is relevant at least in relationship to the question of
the unconscionability of the limitation of consequential damages. But see notes 37-39
and accompanying text supra.
52. Since the majority's holding arguably has the effect of a determination that
limitation of consequential damages in a case such as Collins is per se rather than
prima facie unconscionable, it creates an anomaly. The court would apparently follow
the Code and allow disclaimer of all express warranties (see UCC § 2-316), while at
the same time forbidding limitation of remedy for a warranty extended, contrary to
the plan outlined by UCC § 2-719. For criticisms of this situation arising under the
Code's scheme, see R. DUSENBERG & C. KING, SALES AND BULK TRANSFERS UNDER
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7.03, at 7-47 n.30 (1969); Peters, Remedies for
Breach of Contracts Relating to the Sale of Goods Under the Uniform Commercial
Code: A Roadniap to Article Two, 73 YALE L.J. 199, 282-83 (1966); Speidel, The
Virginian "Anti-Privity" Statute: Strict Products Liability Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 51 VA. L. REV. 804, 838 (1965).
53. Under UCC § 2-314, the implied warranty of merchantability, which covers
defects in the product, arises by operation of law. In New Jersey, in some instances,
this warranty cannot be disclaimed, and so protection for the consumer is provided,
to an extent, even if no express warranty is extended by the manufacturer. See note
32 and accompanying text supra.
54. The dissent's position would allow rebuttal of the prima facie unconscion-
ability of § 2-719(3), while allowing for freedom of contract to the manufacturer. At
the same time, the implied warranty of merchantability, in circumstances where it is
not subject to disclaimer, would assure that the manufacturer was not protecting
himself at the expense of the consumer. See notes 32, 53 and accompanying text supra.
55. The majority expressed the opinion that plaintiff in the instant case should
not be penalized for joining a count in strict liability. See note 39 supra.
56. As a procedural matter, the determination of unconscionability is a question
of law for the court. See UCC § 2-302. 10
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return a "special verdict" upon all relevant issues of fact.57 With these
answers, the judge could make his determination without regard to the
matter of a defendant's strict liability in tort.
Despite the appealing simplicity of the "no defect" approach, it does
present difficulties. One problem is whether an adverse finding on the
strict liability count actually indicates a jury determination of "no defect."
The majority suggested that the jury verdict could also indicate that plain-
tiff failed to meet her burden of proof.58 However, this argument is re-
butted by Justice Clifford's observation that due to the jury's verdict that
the express warranty had been breached, 9 and the obvious unreasonably
dangerous character of the product,60 all of the elements of a cause of
action in strict liability were present - except for a defect. As a result,
the jury's denial of recovery on the strict liability count must have been
based upon a finding that no defect existed. Furthermore, although the
possibility of alternative interpretations of the jury decision exists, this
objection has validity only in the instant case. It would not affect determi-
nations made independent of a strict liability claim using the practical
approach outlined by the dissent.61 In this respect, the "no defect" premise
presents minor difficulties.
However, whether a showing of "no defect" is appropriate evidence
to overcome the section 2-719(3) presumption raises a more serious issue.
In enunciating this theory, the dissenter countered the majority's conten-
tion regarding legislative intent6 2 by stating that his colleagues' conclusion
did not follow "either in logic or in law" from the irrelevance of the exist-
ence of defect to breach of the Uniroyal express warranty.6 3 As support
for this thesis, the dissent argued that the legislature intended "something"
to negate this presumption, and that in consideration of the lack of prece-
dent on this point, it was "not unreasonable nor inequitable nor contrary
to the likely legislative intent" to adopt this approach. 64 Both the majority
and the dissent were less than authoritative in their respective discussions
of this point since their statements about legislative intent were entirely
57. 64 N.J. at 274, 315 A.2d at 24 (Clifford, J., dissenting). The "special verdict"
is a procedural device whereby the jury specifically indicates its determination of
particular issues of fact.
58. Id. at 262, 315 A.2d at 18.
59. Since proximate cause and damages, two elements of a cause of action in
strict liability, are also elements of a cause of action for breach of an express war-
ranty, the jury verdict on the warranty claim indicated that these elements were
present. Id. at 266 n.4, 315 A.2d at 20 n.4 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
60. With respect to the dangerousness of the product, Justice Clifford stated that
[Ilt is theoretically possible that the jury found the product to be defective but
not unreasonably dangerous and based their verdict on the absence of that element.
But as a practical matter it strikes me that such an analysis of the jury's verdict
is totally unrealistic on the facts of this case. There appears to be no way that a
defective tire which proximately causes a vehicular accident could not be unrea-
sonably dangerous.
Id. (Clifford, J., dissenting).
61. See notes 56-57 and accompanying text supra.
62. See note 38 and accompanying text supra.
63. 64 N.J. at 267, 315 A.2d at 20 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 268, 315 A.2d at 21 (Clifford, J., dissenting). 11
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conclusory, and made without any citation to legislative history. The only
authority cited by the dissent were cases in which the products involved
were determined to be defective."5 Justice Clifford emphasized the existence
of defect in these cases, thus implying support for his contention that free-
dom from defect was determinative on the unconscionability issue.66
Unfortunately, the cited cases did not directly provide a connection
between existence of defect and unconscionability. In two of the cases,6 7
it was necessary to prove existence of a defect in order to recover damages
because the manufacturer warranted only against defects, 8 unlike Uniroyal
which warranted against tire failure "from any cause."6 9 Therefore, with-
out proof of a defect in those cases, there would have been no issue of
the unconscionability of limiting damages since the plaintiffs would not
have been entitled to recover. In addition, the third case cited by Justice
Clifford, Ford Motor Co. v. Reid 7 0 was inapposite because it involved no
personal injury and therefore no presumption of unconscionability, regard-
less of the existence of any defect. Thus, it appears that there is no direct
support in the case law for the dissent's approach. However, as the
opinion points out, neither is there case law with which this rule would
conflict. 71 Furthermore, these cases could lend themselves to an alternative
interpretation that rebuttal is possible only where there is no defect in the
product. Consequently, the "no defect" principle should not be overlooked
as a viable solution to the question of what showing is necessary to negate
the prima facie unconscionability of section 2-719(3), at least as limited
65. See notes 90-95 and accompanying text infra.
66. 64 N.J. at 268, 315 A.2d at 21 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
67. Ford Motor Co. v. Tritt, 244 Ark. 883, 430 S.W.2d 778 (1968); Walsh v.
Ford Motor Co., 59 Misc. 2d 241, 298 N.Y.S.2d 538 (Sup. Ct. 1969). For a brief dis-
cussion of both of these cases, see note 28 supra.
68. In Ford Motor Co. v. Tritt, 244 Ark. 883, 430 S.W.2d 778 (1968), the
plaintiff brought an action for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability,
while in Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 59 Misc. 2d 241, 298 N.Y.S.2d 538 (Sup. Ct.
1969), the plaintiff brought an action for breach of the implied warranty of mer-
chantability and an express warranty against defects. See note 28 supra.
The implied warranty of merchantability arises under UCC § 2-314 which, by
defining merchantable goods, implies that unmerchantable goods are defective goods.
According to section 2-314,
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and...
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and ...
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may
require; and
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container or
label if any.
UCC § 2-314(2). The official comment to this section makes clear that this definition
of merchantability is not all-inclusive. UCC § 2-314, Comment 6. In a strict liability
setting, "defective product" has been defined in a manner analogous to the definition
given in section 2-314. For example, a defective product has been defined as one which
"fails to match the average quality of like products," or deviates from the norm, or
is dangerous beyond the contemplation of the ordinary user. Traynor, The Ways and
Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363, 367, 370
(1965). Similarly, such a product has been defined as one which could have been
made safe through installation of a feasible safety device. Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Corp.,
60 N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 281 (1972). See 4 SETON HALL L. REV. 397 (1972).
69. For the terms of Uniroyal warranty, see note 4 supra.
70. 250 Ark. 176, 465 S.W.2d 80 (1971).
71. 64 N.J. at 268, 215 A.2d at 21 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
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to the Collins type situation. Indeed, this rule comports with the implica-
tion which arises from the phrase "prima facie," that rebuttal is possible.
Still, in spite of the appealing simplicity of the dissent's approach, it may
be subject to the challenge that it is not truly consistent with the con-
cept of unconscionability.
Unconscionability, as considered under section 2-302, the principal
UCC provision on this subject, relates both to the bargaining process72
and to the terms of the contract itself.73 From the case law interpreting
section 2-302 it appears that elements of both procedural and substantive
inequities must appear in order for a court 74 to make a determination that
unconscionability is present.75 In Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture
Co.,76 one of the earliest cases mentioning section 2-302, the court cited
the section 77 in remanding for findings on the issue of unconscionability.
The Walker-Thomas court stated:
Unconscionability has generally been recognized to include an absence
of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with
contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party.78
Since Walker-Thomas, most courts have applied this standard, requiring
some measure of lack of meaningful choice (procedural unconscionability)
plus one-sided contract terms (substantive unconscionability) in order to
make a positive determination. 79 However, it is at least arguable that in
72. Unconscionability in the bargaining process, or "procedural unconscionability,"
relate to the balance of power between the parties to a contract. See Leff, supra note
22, at 489-508; Spanogle, supra note 22, at 944.
73. Unconscionability in the terms of the contract, or "substantive unconscion-
ability" exists when the terms themselves are harsh or oppressive. According to the
official comment to section 2-302:
The basic test is whether, in the light of the general commercial background and
the commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the clauses involved are so
one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the time of
the making of the contract .... The principle is one of the prevention of oppression
and unfair surprise (Cf. Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1948))
and not of disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior bargaining power.
UCC § 2-302, Comment 1. See Leff, supra note 22, at 509-28; Spanogle, supra note 22,
at 944.
74. UCC § 2-302(1). For the text of this section, see note 22 supra.
75. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 12, at § 4-7; Spanogle, supra note 22,
at 943, 950.
76. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
77. Although the court cited section 2-302, it had not been enacted in the District
of Columbia at the time of the decision. Walker-Thomas presented a situation wherein
a welfare mother signed a complex cross-collateral agreement, which, in effect, provided
Walker-Thomas, a large furniture store, with a security interest in all purchased items
until the total balance of all these items was paid. Plaintiff defaulted after paying
nearly the total amount, and Walker-Thomas replevied the collateral. Id. at 447.
78. Id. at 449.
79. See Leff, supra note 22 at 539-41; Spanogle, supra note 22, at 954-69. Pro-
cedural unconscionability has seemingly been defined to include aspects of consumer
ignorance - which a court assumed to be present - along with disreputable conduct
by the seller, such as including oppressive terms not noticed by or comprehensible to
the consumer buyer. See, e.g., Jefferson Credit Corp. v. Marcano, 60 Misc. 2d 138, 302
N.Y.S.2d 390 (Civ. Ct. 1969) (Spanish-speaking plaintiff unable to read contract
written in English). Although nearly all the cases finding procedural unconscion-
ability have involved plaintiffs disadvantaged in terms of knowledge or wealth, courts
have not limited unconscionability discussions to these classes of consumers. As illus-
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two cases, American Home Improvement, Inc. v. Maclver,8 0 and Toker
v. Westerman,8 ' substantive unconscionability alone was sufficient.
If the weight of the affirmative showing necessary for a plaintiff to
establish unconscionability under section 2-302 were also required of a
defendant to rebut the presumption of unconscionability created under
section 2-719(3), the dissent's position could be supported, provided un-
conscionability may be found where there is only substantive unconscion-
ability, i.e., oppressive terms. Clearly, where used to avoid liability result-
ing from the effects of a defective product, the contractual limitation of
remedy falls within the category of substantive unconscionability. s2 How-
ever, where an express warranty covers aspects other than defect,8 3 the
character of the product - that is, whether defective or non-defective -
could be determinative in assessing the unfairness of such limitation. Thus,
the dissent's position does have merit, at least in the limited situation pre-
sented by Collins. Moreover, even if both procedural and substantive
unconscionability must be present, the dissenting thesis could still be
viable if one further element were added, viz., the requirement that the
court must also find the clause in question to be conspicuous and under-
standable on the face of the contract.8 4 While this would establish pro-
cedural conscionability, it might unduly complicate the test. Objection
might be raised that it is a fiction that consumers, whether middle-class
or disadvantaged, actually read the contract. Furthermore, this could
introduce a variable which would lead to different results depending upon
the classification of the plaintiff.85
trated by the New Jersey Supreme Court's pre-Code decision in Henningsen v. Bloom-
field Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), even a middle-class consumer may
have no bargaining power in relation to a large organization or an industry possessing
monopolistic tendencies. See generally WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 12, at § 4-3.
Courts have found substantive unconscionability in cases falling within two
main categories: 1) those involving excessive price and 2) those involving creditor
manipulation of his own or the debtor's remedial rights, as in Collins. See, e.g.,
American Home Imp., Inc. v. Maclver, 105 N.H. 435, 201 A.2d 886 (1964) (excessive
price); Denkin v. Sterner, 10 Pa. D.&C.2d 203 (C.P. 1956) (liquidated damage
clause unconscionable).
80. 105 N.H. 435, 201 A.2d 886 (1964). In Maclver, as an alternative holding,
the court declared the contract unconscionable because of excessive price. The buyer-
defendants were apparently middle-class homeowners. Id. at 439, 201 A.2d at 889.
81. 113 N.J. Super. 452, 274 A.2d 78 (Dist. Ct. 1970). The court determined
that the contract for sale of an appliance purchased from a door-to-door salesman was
unconscionable because of excessive price. Id. at 454, 274 A.2d at 80. There was
apparently no procedural unconscionability, unless the door-to-door aspect of the sale
can be viewed as creating a more pressured environment for the transaction.
82. See note 79 supra.
83. If the product is defective, any such limitation of remedy by a manufacturer
could be considered substantively unconscionable because of the greater probability
that injury will occur. See note 79 supra.
84. See UCC § 1-201(10) for the definition of "conspicuous." However, a re-
quirement that limitation of remedy must be conspicuous would, to a certain extent,
confuse limitation of remedy with disclaimer of an implied warranty of merchantability
or of fitness for particular purpose under UCC § 2-316(2). See note 28 supra.
85. Different standards might be applied depending upon the intelligence or wealth
of the plaintiff, thus defeating the omni-inclusiveness of the "no defect" rule standing
alone. See note 79 supra.
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Although the dissent's test for rebuttal may be practical only if sub-
stantive unconscionability may be considered, it is more valid theoretically
than the majority's. The majority reached a decision apparently based
upon a policy decision to protect the consumer, rather than upon the
seemingly clear intent of the UCC to the contrary.8 6 As a result, the
Collins court has effectively foreclosed what would have appeared to have
been the only reasonably available means of rebuttal, thus arguably having
rewritten section 2-719(3) to read "per se" rather than "prima facie."
In light of this interpretation, it is submitted that, even were the dissent's
rule for rebuttal not acceptable, other courts should avoid doing such
violence to the letter and spirit of the Code. They must, at a minimum,
realistically review the available evidence and judge the conduct of the
manufacturer in the light thereof. The Code, by constructing a prima
facie standard, clearly anticipated that there would be circumstances where-
in the manufacturer's conduct might be judged to be fair when viewed
with the evidence. Although this is a more complex approach than the
dissent's, it would more conform to the scheme of the UCC.87 This mode
of analysis obviously would not be as favorable as the dissent's to a manu-
facturer who has given an express warranty beyond that implied by law.
Under the "no defect" principle of rebuttal, once, lack of defect was shown,
the burden of proof would shift, requiring the plaintiff to affirmatively
establish unconscionability. Absent the "no defect" method, the burden
would remain with the defendant, and it therefore- would be more difficult
for him to prevail. Obviously, the majority in Collins has chosen to go
beyond the generous limits of the Code in protecting the consumer by leaving
a burden of proof upon the defendant manufacturer' which is impossible to
meet. Even if the court's questionable legal analysis is accepted, the question
of the economic wisdom of this policy with relationship to the tire industry
in particular, and to commercial dealings in general, remains.
If it be assumed that sellers will continue to offer express warranties,
as the majority believes they will,88 the effect of the Collins decision is to
impose upon the producer an additional cost of doing business.8 9 Manu-
facturers understandably will shift as much of this cost increase as possible
86. See notes 20-21 and accompanying text supra. The majority's decision is not
surprising, however. The considerations reflected by the opinion in Collins parallel
the trend which has extended manufacturers' strict liability in tort. See text accom-
panying note 94 infra. Also, at least one similar decision regarding liability of manu-
facturers for breach of express warranty has been miade.in a pre-Code setting. In
Gore v. George J. Ball, Inc., 279 N.C. 192, 182 S.E.2d 389 (1971), the Supreme Court
of North Carolina refused to enforce a contractual limitation of damages clause in a
contract between a seed-seller and a farmer where purely economic loss was involved,
because it determined that the clause was against the public policy of the state.
87. See notes 72-75 and accompanying text supra.
88. See 64 N.J. at 262, 315 A.2d at 18. See note 41 and accompanying text supra.
89. In order to maintain the economic viability of their organizations, New Jersey
businessmen may be forced to provide for protection from what is at least arguably a
new form of liability imposed bythe Collins court. Insulation from this liability may
be accomplished through self-insurance, whereby a business entity establishes a fund
from which claims can be paid, or through the procurement of an additional insurance
policy. In either event, there will be a cost increase to the producer.
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to the consumer in the form of higher prices. 90 The wisdom of the court's
effectively creating higher prices is particularly dubious where a non-
defective product is involved. 91 No longer is the buyer the one able to
decide whether his utility is maximized by paying for protection against
injury resulting from a non-defective product.9 2  This choice has been
virtually foreclosed by the New Jersey Supreme Court's new form of
social insurance. 93
Since the Collins decision in effect imposes strict liability upon the
defendant who uses this type of warranty, it is apparently founded, as is
the theory of strict liability, on the premise that the manufacturer is more
capable of bearing the economic loss involved, since he can spread the cost
of the loss over a greater number of people. 94 However, since continued
extension of this warranty to the consumer means an increased price for
a product which the consumer must, for practical purposes, continue to
buy,9 5 this type of decision may actually be harmful to the consumer in
the long run. This is especially true since usually the consumer also must
pay for both life and health insurance to cover the type of injury sus-
90. To preserve their existing profit margins, manufacturers will strive to impose
the full cost of insuring against liability for personal injury involving non-defective
products. How successful this effort will be, i.e., what percentage of the new cost
the seller will be able to shift to the consumer, depends upon the elasticity of demand
for particular products. Elasticity varies between products within the same class, as
well as between different product classes. For an explanation of the concept of demand
elasticity and the ability of the seller to shift cost increases to the buyer, thereby
preserving his profits, see generally G. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE (3d ed. 1966).
91. The courts have imposed strict liability in tort on a seller who delivers a
defective product. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57,
27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897 (1963). Greenman was the first case wherein a court
applied Section 402A of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS. See note 2 supra.
As a policy matter, it is felt that the high probability of personal injury
arising from the operational failure of a defective product is a sufficient reason to
impose the role of an insurer upon the seller. Since the seller is profiting as the
producer of a product which is likely to cause harm, it is fair that he bear the cost of
any loss attributable to his inadequate workmanship. Absent this causal relationship,
however, as in the case of the sale of a non-defective product, it is much less clear that
the consuming public will be benefited. See note 92 infra.
92. Due to the decision in Collins, if the buyer is to acquire the product at all, he
must pay his proportionate share of his seller's insurance cost. Given the alternative,
many consumers may have preferred to spend their incomes in other, more satisfying
manners. See G. STIGLER, supra note 90, ch. 4.
93. The decision to promulgate a per se rule with regard to UCC § 2-719(3)
has the effect of indemnifying those buyers who are injured by the extraction of a
higher commodity price from those who continue to purchase.
94. See, e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436,
440 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring). The use of a large entity to spread the loss
suffered by an unfortunate few is an appealing concept. It is appropriate where injury
is caused by the manufacturer of a defective product. However, where the product
involved is not defective, the imposition of liability solely for the purpose of spreading
loss raises serious questions regarding the optimal allocation of society's scarce re-
sources. For a discussion of the most efficient means by which to allocate resources,
see G. STIGLER, supra note 90, ch. 4.
95. Tires in particular are a rather inelastic commodity, due in part to the lack
of an adequate substitute. The more inelastic a product, the easier it is to force con-
sumers to suffer a price increase. See note 90 supra. Of course, whether there will
be a cost increase depends upon the validity of the majority's assumption that tire
manufacturers will continue to offer a warranty. A manufacturer has the alternative
of eliminating the warranty, thereby removing the risk of damage claims arising from
the failure of non-defective tires.
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tained in the instant case. 96 Consequently, the court ultimately may have
injured the consumer by increasing his burden.97 In any event, consumer-
plaintiffs already have available a remedy in strict liability in tort, and the
trend is toward extending manufacturers' liability under this theory ;98 a de-
cision contrary to that in Collins would not necessarily prevent these eco-
nomic consequences from later arising within a different legal framework.
In summary, then, Collins v. Uniroyal, Inc. seemingly did violence
to both the letter and the spirit of the UCC by transforming a presumed-
to-be-rebuttable standard into one in practice insurmountable; it portends
the withdrawal of a measure of added value from sales by manufacturers
who now must fear going beyond the confines of legally imposed war-
ranties; and it potentially imposes upon the consumer, whose buying power
is steadily being eroded, a further burden not necessarily justified and
clearly not invited. In other words, Collins represents questionable law,
and, it is submitted, should not be followed by other courts seeking sound
precedent in a difficult area.
Katherine A. Bomba
96. Injury involving non-defective products is merely-one of many contingencies
against which health and life insurance seek to protect. For this reason it is doubtful
that New Jersey policyholders will now discontinue their coverage. But it is clear
that they will be paying higher commodity prices as a result of Collins.
97. For discussion of the economic impact of various solutions to products liability
problems, see generally Buchanan, In Defense of Caveat Emptor, 38 U. CHI. L. REV.
64 (1970); Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & EcoN. 1 (1960); Cowan,
Some Policy Bases of Product Liability, 17 STAN. L. REv. 1077 (1965) ; Keeton,
Products Liability - Some Observations About Allocation of Risks, 64 MIcH. L.
REV. 1329 (1966) ; McKean, Products Liability: Trends and Implications, 38 U. CHI.
L. REV. 3 (1970).
98. See Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50
MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966).
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